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small group of the class to bring the action, practical difficulties can be
minimized. There will be no necessity to canvass the group in advance
of the action in an attempt to reach an agreement on attorneys, procedures
of the action or control of the suit in general. However, this does not
mean that a class suit should proceed without adequate representation,
for it is a fundamental rule that those bringing such action must adequately
represent the class.
The various rules formulated by the courts for regulating problems
arising in control of class suits are, with very few exceptions, well settled
and have been followed for many years in various jurisdictions throughout
this country and in England. After a review of the above cases and the
problems which they present, it seems safe to say that these rules have
satisfactorily met the problems which will inevitably arise so long as the
class suit itself is recognized.
HARRY L. HARRIS.

CLAYTON Acr AMENDMENT-LOoPHOLE CLOSED

This exposition is concerned mainly with the state of the law in regard
to Section 7 of the Clayton Act' as it was formulated from 1914 to 1950
and the effect of the Amendment of 1950, passed in the closing days of the
2
81st Congress.
Section 7 is a restraint on corporations; little doubt exists on that
point. 3 It prohibits one corporation from eliminating another competitor
corporation from the market by purchasing the stock of the latter where
there may be a substantial lessening of competition.4 The Supreme Court
of the United States has planted several guideposts along the highway for
use in construction of the statute. A strict construction should be given
as the section is partly penal in nature and forced constructions will not be
tolerated. 5 The section was designed for the protection of the public
against the evils which are resultant from a substantial lessening of competition. 6 The basic issue is not merely stock acquisition but the effect
7
of such acquisition upon commerce.
1.
2.
3
4.
5.
6.
7.

38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C., Sec. 18.
P. L. 899, Dec. 29, 1950.
Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th 1925), reversed on other grounds,
272 U.S. 554 (1926).
See note 1, supra.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. I. C. C., 66 F. (2d) 37 (C. C. A. 3rd 1933), affirmed 291
U.S. 651.
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291. 50 Sup. Ct. 89, 74 L. Ed. 431 (1930).
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, supra; V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F. (2d) 273
(C. C. A. 2nd 1931); Aluminum Co. v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 3rd 1922),
certiorari denied, 261 U.S. 616.

NoTEs

Section 7 prohibits one corporation from acquiring the stock of a
competitor only where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition between the two, or to restrain such commerce in any section or
community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.8 This
section does not prohibit a corporation engaged in commerce from purchasing stock of another corporation engaged in commerce, where the
effect is merely a possibility that there will be a substantially lessened field
of competition. 9 In V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, the
finding was in accord with the aforementioned rules of law. It appeared
that two corporations in the same cosmetic line were engaged in commerce,
X was worth three million, while Y was worth four million and the former
purchased the latter. The highest tribunal held that in the light of the
fact that the total industry was valued at one hundred and twenty-five
million there was no substantial lessening of competition. 10 Another
interesting situation occurred in InternationalShoe Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission where there was evidence of acquisition by the Shoe Manufacturing Company, which was distributing to small towns, of the stock of a corporation whose outlet was in the cities. The court therefore concluded
that there was no substantial lessening of competition." The amendment
of 1950 does not in any way alter the existing law as aforementioned. However, the rules enunciated have been the subject of comment,' 2 some holding
that the interpretation given by the courts has rendered the section a
nullity.' 3
There are three interesting devices, two of which operated before the
recent amendment to advantage of the combining corporation, while one
operated to the latter's detriment.
By purchasing the assets of a competitor corporation rather than the
stock of the latter, jurisdiction was denied to the Federal Trade Commission.
The theory behind the denial was that the situation was not prohibited
by Section 7, hence the statement, mergers by transfer of assets are permissible.

14

The second favorable situation occurred where the corporation had
purchased the stock, conceding it to be unlawful, and in a race with the FTC
had liquidated the competitor corporation by surrending the stock for all
8.
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See note 7, all cases, supra.
See note 7, all cases, supra.
V. Vivaudou, Inc. v. FTC, 54 F. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 2nd 1931).
International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 50 Sup. Ct. 89, 74 L. Ed. 431 (1930).
Montague, G. H., The Commission's Jurisdiction over Practices in Restraint of
Trade: A Large-Scale Method of Mass Enforcement of the Anti-Trust Laws, 8 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 365 (1940); Irvine, R. P., The Uncertainties of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 14 Cornell L. Q. 28 (1928); 27 Mich. L. Rev. 931 (1929); 38 Yale L. J.
830 (1929); 39 Yale L. J, 1042 (1930); 4 Tulane L. Rev. 638 (1930); 24 I11.L. Rev.
908 (1930).
Montague, supra note 12, at 375-8; Irvine, supra note 12, at 30.
Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587, 54 Sup. Ct. 532, 78 L.
Ed. 1007 (1934).
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the assets. This operated to deprive the FTC of jurisdiction, on the theory
that the merger had been consummated and the remedy must be had through
the courts. 15 The detrimental situation (for the corporation) occurred
where the corporation was not fast enough for the FTC or the FTC found
out too soon, for then there was jurisdiction. This factual situation is
very similar to the preceding second favorable situation, except that the
assets had not completely changed hands. Hence as part of the divestiture
of stock order, and to effectuate legislative policy, divestiture of the assets
so held was proper. 16 The conclusion then is that the corporation had to have
17
title and possession of all the assets for the purposes of thwarting the FTC.
Two other situations have occurred which should be mentioned. One
dilemma a corporation found itself in was where the FTC had ordered it
to divest itself of stock illegally held in a competitor corporation and this
same corporation found itself subsequently a creditor of the to be divested
corporation. The Supreme Court permitted the creditor to bid in at the
sale for the same properties, inasmuch as the debt was bona fide and no
18
fraud had been alleged.
The second situation occurred where one corporation invested in a
competitor corporation claiming the transaction was solely for purposes
of making a return. The court held that the corporation was attempting to
do indirectly what it could not do directly, to wit, eliminate a competitor
corporation. 19 Of course the burden of proof is on the FTC here 20 as in
all these cases. 21 Investment is permitted under the original Section 7 and
as amended, 22 however it must be a bona fide investment. The transaction
will certainly be looked upon with suspicion if the transaction is with an
23
active competitor.
For years the FTC has been advocating an amendment to the Clayton
Act in order to close up these loopholes. 24 In 1950, in the closing days
of the 81st Congress, the amendment was passed. 2 5 An analysis of the
amendment reveals that the loopholes are indeed plugged and very tightly
so. No longer may a corporation effectuate a merger by purchasing the
15.
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FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175, 71 L. Ed. 405 (1926).
Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554, 47 Sup. Ct. 175, 71 L. Ed. 405 (1926).
Compare FTC v. Western Meat Co. in note 15, supra, with Thatcher Mfg. Co. v.
FTC in note 16, supra.
Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 33 F. (2d) 824 (C. C. A. 9th 1929), certiorari dismissed, 281 U.S. 771.
Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th 1925), reversed on other grounds,
272 U.S. 554 (1926).
Swift & Co. v. FTC, supra.
See notes 5, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 18, supra; U. S. Republic Steel Corporation, 11 F.
Supp. 117 (N. D. Ohio 1935).
See notes 1 and 2 supra.
Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 7th 1925), reversed on other grounds,
272 U.S. 554 (1926).
Twenty-Five Annual Report of the Federal Trade Commission, released December
29, 1939. Same recommendation made in fiscal report for 1940-1.
See note 2, supra.

NOTES

assets of a competitor rather than the stock. 26 Both types of merger are
now expressly made illegal providing the requisite effect on competition
exists. 27 Aware of the previous strict construction the Supreme Court of
the United States has given, mergers to be consummated by seeking the
assets first as aforementioned are specifically forbidden. 28 A result of
making acquisition of assets illegal is to bring down the other notable
exception that of purchasing the stock, conceded to be unlawful, and
acquiring the assets by surrender of the stock before the FTC held a
29
hearing.
The comment to Congress by the FTC can be, better late than never,
because for years corporations with the able assistance of the U.S. Supreme
Court were rendering Section 7 of a nullity doing indirectly what they could
not do directly.
HERBERT SAUL

ROVNER.

CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED FOR RATIFICATION BY ACQUIESCENCE

A principal is liable for the act of his agent when the agent has authority to do the act or when after the act is done the principal ratifies it.
When the authority is not given in the first instance the principal is required, after knowledge of the action taken, to affirmatively adopt or
ratify the action as his own or he must fail to act affirmatively when the
circumstances require such action if he is to be held liable for the unauthorized act. The latter is ratification by acquiescence. No act or
ratification by the agent is sufficient. The ratification must be by the
principal as he is the only one who had authority to authorize the act
originally. It is the situation in which ratification by acquiescence is
being proved that the knowledge of the principal becomes most important.
These principles of ratification would seem to apply equally to a corporation.
The problems of the requirement of knowledge become more acute
in the corporate situation where all action is by agents. There authority
is delegated by the board of directors, and so it would seem that before
there could be ratification by asquiescence of an unauthorized act the
board of directors would have to be apprised of the act.
There may be ratification by acquiescence in case affirmative action
is taken pursuant to the unauthorized contract, or there may be ratifica26.
27.
28.
29.

See note 2 for citation of amendment, supra.
See note 2 for citation of amendment, supra.
See note 2 for citation of amendment, supra.
Compare Section 7 (see note 1 for citation), amendment
and cases in notes 15 and 16, supra, with each other.

(see note 2 for citation)

